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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DARREN J. POLLICK, by and
through his Guardian ad Litem, John R.
Pollick, and JOHN R. POLLICK,

Plai,ntiff-Respondent,

Case No.
11880

vs.
J.C. PENNEY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a negligence action to recover damages for
personal injuries suffered by Darren J. Pollick, a
1

minor, as a result of falling over a banister in defendant's store, located at 4849 South State Street, Murray,
Utah.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which returned a
verdict in favor of the minor for damages in the sum of
$2,500.00 and awarded the sum of $821.36 to the father
for medical expenses.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the jury verdict and
granting either a judgment as a matter of law or a new
trial. Plaintiff contends the verdict rendered by the jury
should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the defendant's brief is generally accurate. However, the plaintiffs
feel that the following amplification would be helpful
in order for this Court to determine the issues presented
in this case. It is, of course, the position of the plaintiffs
herein that in determining the arguments set forth by
the defendant that the facts must be construed most
favorable to the plaintiffs for the reason that there is
a jury verdict in this case. This is particularly true in
regard to Point I of Defendant's Brief. The facts are
these:
2

The plaintiff, John R. Pollick, accompanied by his
three
old son on .May 5, 1964, went to defendant's
5tore at 1'849 South State Street, Murray, Utah, to
purchase a Mother's Day gift ( R. 122-123). The
plaintiff went to the Ladies' Department, which is located on the main floor of the store. Directly opposite
the department and in the center of the main fioor is
a stairwell which leads to the basement. Surrounding
three sides of the stairwell is a wooden banister. The
banister is approximateyl 36 inches high and attached
to the base and extending around the banister is a
mopboard 71/2 inches high and % of an inch wide. The
child, Darren Pollick, testified that he climbed the
banister in question, that is, the mopboard allowed him
to stand on the same and he so remembered this before
his injury.
Mr. Pollick selected a dress and while standing
at the cash register to complete the sale, he heard a
scream and went to the stairway where he saw his boy
in the arms of the manager of the store. The manager
advised plaintiff his boy had fallen over the banister
and landed on a display rack approximately eleven
feet below in the basement. The boy suffered a broken
leg as a result of the accident.
Plaintiffs filed this case to recover damages for the
injuries sustained by the minor child and for medical
expenses. Plaintiffs proceeded upon the theory they
were business invitees and defendant neglected to exercise due care to make the premlses reasonably safe for

3

them by maintaining the aforementioned banister in a
dangerous and unsafe condition.
It should be pointed out at this juncture that the
plaintiff's theory was simply that the defendant, in allowing a climbable mopboard to be attached to the
wooden banister, was negligent under the circumstances in that the store knew and, in fact, encouraged
children of tender years to be present on its premises.
The defendant throughout its brief seems to indicate
that it was the position of the plaintiff that there was
some negligence in the construction of the banister but
the defendant in st;tting the plaintiff's position has created a strawman. The fact of the matter is that the plaintiff's theory proceeded on the fact that the defendant,
under the circumstances, maintained a dangerous and
unsafe condition for children of tender years.
Darren clearly testified that immediately prior to
the fall he was standing on top of the mopboard and
then he fell (R. no).
The manager of the store, Mr. Dennis Barlocker,
testified as follows:
(R. 161, 162)

"Q. Now, it's a matter of fact isn't it, Mr.
Barlocker, that J. C. Penney's as a department
store, prides itself in family, or having families
come and shop there, isn't that right?

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And while you were there for three and
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a half years, you saw a lot of little children in
that place, haven't you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And in fact it's a common practice for
people to come with small children, isn't that
right?

"A. Yes.
"Q. And, of course, you've known that all
along and while you were there at the Murray
office that's-you've known that, haven't you?

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And it's not uncommon for small children
to be in and about the store?

"A. No, sir.
"Q. Now, I guess, also, one of your particular
duties, isn't it Mr. Barlocker, is to make sure that
this place is safe for the patrons when they come
in there, isn't that right?

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And, now you were familiar were you not
with this particular banister that borders this
said well?

"A. Very familiar with it.
"Q. And this particular bannister, I guess, it
also had a little bit of a beauty sign to it, is that
right?

"MR. NEBEKER: Little what?
"MR. DIBBLEE: Was it there for beauty?
Was it there for beauty?
"A. No, not necessarily.
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"Q. So, therefore, then it was just for the purpose of having this handrail that the people use,
is that correct ?

"A. Well, it was built to keep people from
falling in.
"Q. Falling down the stairs 1 The stairs this
way, is that correct?

"A. Yes, definitely.

*

*

*

*

"Q. Now with respect to this particular bannister, Mr. Bariocker, it would have been practical and would have been possible would it not,
sir, to put a little extension along the top of this
railing here to raise it a little higher, to make
it higher, you could do that couldn't you'?

"A. I'm sure it could be done. I am no contractor but I'm sure it could be done.
"Q. Well, as a practical matter it could have
been done, couldn t it, just put some sort of extension on, like this, so that it would make this
higher and rather than being thirty-six inches
from the floor, could have been higher, couldn't
it?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And as a matter of fact this particular
mop board, here, for all practical purposes could
have been removed, could it not, sir?
"A. Defintely.
"Q. And, then, if that particular mop board
had been removed, then small children that were
in the area would not be able to climb up on this
bannister, would they, sir?

*

*
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*

*

"A. Would you restate your question?
"Q. (By Mr. Dibblee) I say, if the mop board
would have been removed, then, little children
that had been walking around wouldn't be able
to put their foot up on there, would they?

"A. No, they wouldn't be able to put their
foot up there.
"Q. And isn't it also true, Mr. Barlocker, that
if J. C. Penney Company had put an extension
up on this particular area on the top of this railing and extended it higher it could have been
done with all practicality, it could prevent people
from falling over the bannister, wouldn't it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And in fact it would have prevented exactly the accident that happened in this case,
wouldn't it?
"A. Yes, sir."
Based on this evidence the trial court presented the
case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs, which verdict should be sustained by this
Honorable Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A
FINDING THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.
Throughout defendant's argument and Point I in
particular, reference is made to the fact that Murray
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City has adopted a Building Code that stated that banisters should be of a certain height. The defendant feels
and argues most vigorously that this fact relieves him
from any responsibility. In this connection it is interesting to note the theory that he requested be presented to the jury in Instruction No. 15. That instruction was as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
You are instructed that the Uniform Building
Code contains the following requirements with regard
to guardrails:
"Guardrails. All unenclosed floor openings,
and open and glazed sides of landings and stairs
shall be protected by a guardrail or handrail.
Guardrails shall be not less than thirty-six inches
(36") in height. Intermediate members in open
type railings shall be spaced not more than nine
inches (9") apart." Uniform Building Code, 64
Edition, Vol. I, Sec. 3305.

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence

that the bannister in the defendant's store at Murray,
Utah was not less than 36" in height, then I instruct
you that the construction and maintenance of the banister would be in compliance with the Uniform Building Code.
It can be seen that this instruction is simply a
statement of fact and did not help the jury in determining whether or not the particular circumstances the
defendant was or was not negligent in the maintaining

of its premises. The trial court refused to give the instructicin. The instruction, to be proper, should have
stated, in conformity with well-recognized law, that
compliance with the Building Code is some evidence
of whether or not there was a breach of duty. As mentioned earlier, the defendant did not articulate this view
and now seems to insist that the mere fact of compliance with a Building Code as to the height of a banister
(not taking into consideration the fact that the mopboard was climbable) relieves it from any and all obligation. This argument, it is respectfully suggested, is
patently erroneous.
The plaintiffs' theory of negligence was set forth
in Instructions No. 17 and 18. The trial court gave forth
the following instructions and the same, we think, set
forth the proper law that th ejury should consider under
the circumstances of this case. This was the theory of
the plaintiffs.
"INSTRUCTION NO. 17
"You are instructed that business establishments catering to the general public owe a duty
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and in such a manner as not to involve
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons who
might be reasonably anticipated to be in and
about said business establishments.
"In this connection you are instructed that if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the manner in which the defendant maintained
the bannister bordering the stairway leading
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from the Main Floor to the Basement constituted
a condition that was not reasonably safe and that
in allowing said condition to exist def
failed to exercise the degree of care above described, then, and in that event, defendant was
negligent, and if you further find that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of injuries
to the minor children, then you should find the
issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
and assess damages in accordance with these instructions."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 18
"You are instructed that business establishments catering to the general public owe a duty
to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and in such a manner as not to involve
an unreasonable risk of harm to persons who
might be reasonably anticipated to be in and
about said business establishments.
"In this connection you are instructed that if
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant maintained a banister bordering the
stairway leading from the Main Floor to the
Basement at a height that a child of tender years
might climb and the defendant could, with reasonable practicality, have placed upon the top
of the banister an addition which would have
prevented chiddren who may have climbed on
the banister from falling over and down to the
floor below, and if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to
so construct the said addition constituted a failure
to exercise the degree of care above described,
then, and in that event, defendant was negligent,
and if you further find that such negligence, if

IO

any, was a proximate cause of the injuries to the
minor child, then you should find the issues in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendant and
assess damages in accordance with these instruer
tions."
There is in the defendant's brief no objection to
this theory nor any exception to these instructions. The
instructions were defining the standard of care to a business invitee of the defendant in this case, that is, that it
has a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition. The duty, certainly in these instances, is
much more broad than that which is claimed by the
defendant in smugly stating that the banister met certain height requirements of a Building Code. A case
that sets forth the plaintiffs' theory in this case is
Thacker v. J.C. Penney Company (5th CCA) 254 F.
2d 672, in which a two year, two month old child fell
over a 36 inch high railing along the second floor of
the store. It was admitted, as in this case, that it was
reasonable to foresee that children would be in and
about said railing. The trial court granted a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds there was no breach
of duty and no negligence shown. In reversing the
trial court stated stated the following:
"What is the scope of the duty here? A storeowner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety,
but he is under the affirmative duty of exercising
due care under all circumstances. The Restatement speaks of the liability of a landowner to
business visitors 'to exercise reasonable care to
make the land safe for [their] reception'. Re-

ll

statement, Torts, Section 343. Harper and James
state: 'The occupier must use due care not to
injure the plaintiff by negligent activity and alsu
to warn him of latent perils actually known to
the occupier. In addition, the occupier owes the
duty to inspect his premises and to discover
dangerous conditions * * * [as] part of a larger
duty of reasonable caret to make the premises
reasonably safe.' 2 Harper and James, Law of
Torts, Section 27.12, p. 1487.
"A storeowner is under a duty to use due care
safe for all invitees-for
to make the
a young child as well as for an adult. He owes
the same degree of care to both, but, of course,
different precautions must be taken for children,
if the storeowner' s conduct is to measure up to
the standard of due care under all the circumstances. 'The proprietor of a store or shop who
invites or induces children to come upon the
premises must use care to keep the premises
reasonably safe for children. Account is taken,
in determining the precautions necessary to be
exercised, of childish impulses as well as the
fact that certain dangerous conditions in the store
or shop may attract small children to their injury.' 38 American Jurisprudence 799, N egligence, Section 177. Age and the ability of a child
to realize danger, the peculiar attraction certain
installations have for children, childish impulses,
the knowledge that young children frequently
in the past had been attracted to an installation
are all circumstances to be taken into account
in determining whether a storeowner has complied with his duty of care to an invitee who is
a child. If J. C. Penney, through its employees,
had knowledge that children frequently played
on the balcony and were attracted to climbing
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the balcony railing, and if there was a foreseeable
probability of injury by children climbing the
railing and failing, defendant was under a duty
to avoid the danger by taking precautions to
make the premises reasonably safe. Further, even
without the actual knowledge of the peril to
children generally or to Jada particularly, defendant was 'under an affirmative duty to protect invitees against [dangers] which with reasonable care * * * might (be] discover(edJ'.
Prosser, Law of Torts, Sec. 78, p. 453. If therefore the construction of the railing was such
that a reasonable person might expect young
children on the balcony to be attracted to climbing the railing, defendant was under the duty
to use due care to discover this danger and to
protect its invitees against the peril.
"Whether J. C. Penney Company breached
its duty to use due care to make its store reasonably safe for young invitees is the basic issue
in this case. We believe that there was a sufficient showing of a breach of duty for the issue
to be decided by a jury."
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the facts in the
above quoted case are similar to this case. In the case
at bar the record was clear defendant knew that children of the tender age of plaintiff would be in its store
and near the banister. In spite of this knowledge defendant permitted the banister to remain unguarded
and with a climbable mopboard that permitted children
to do what was done in this case. Again it is repeated
that the evidence clearly shows defendant completely
failed to take any precautionary measure to protect
small children that were in the store.
13

As mentioned at the onset in this case, the assumption defendant makes that compliance with a buildiag
code, ipso facto, relieves it of any further liability, is
contrary to the law.
In Wigmore on Evience, Vol. 2, Sec. 461, at page
489, the author compares the effect of a statute or

ordinance with evidence of custom and habit and states
as follows:

"This conduct of others, then, ( 1) is receivable as some evidence of the nature of the thing
in question, because it indicates what is the influence of the thing on the ordinary person in
that situation; but ( 2) it is not to be taken as
fixing a legal standard for the conduct required
by law.

*

*

*

*

"The proper method is to receive it, with an
express caution that it is merely evidential and
is not to serve as a legal standard."
The author then cites the case of Texas and P R
Compwny v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct.Rpr. 622,
wherein Justice Holmes stated:
"What usually is done may be evidence of
what ought to be done, but what ought to be
done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence whether it usually is complied with or not."
It is clear from the foregoing authority the compliance with the Code does not excuse this defendant
from liability.
It is respectfully submitted that certainly there
were sufficient facts for the jury to consider whether
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or nut the defendant was guilty of negligence in this
particular instance. The only uncontroverted and unimpeached evidence that the defendant relies upon is the
conclusion of the Building Code which is not an insulation from liability to a storeowner. The question
is whether or not the jury was unreasonable in finding
negligence when defendant invited children to be in
the store and permitted a banister to be in the area where
the children would be which was climbable.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ALLOW
INTO EVIDENCE IN ANY MANNER THE
FACT THAT DEFENDANT MADE REPAIRS
TO THE BANISTER SUBSEQUENT TO THE
ACCIDENT.
The defendant has cited persuasive authority that
once an accident has occurred evidence of subsequent
repairs is not admissible to show that there was negligence at the earlier period of time. The plaintiff does
not disagree with this rule. There was no evidence that
was introduced which in any manner showed the fact
that the defendant subsequent to the accident increased
the height of the bannister by 17 inches. 'Vhat did
occur is that the following questions were asked to
defendant's store manager:
"Q. Now, with respect to this particular bannister, Mr. Barlocker, it would have been prac-
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tical and would have been possible would it not,
sir, to put a little extension along the top of this
railing here to raise it a little higher, to m'lke
it higher, you could do that couldn't you?
"A. I'm sure it could be done. I man no contractor but I'm sure it could be done.

"Q. Well, as a practical matter it could have
been done, couldn't it, just put some sort of extension on, like this, so that it would make this
higher and rather than being thirty-six inches
from the floor, could have been higher, couldn't
it?

"A. Yes."
It appears that what counsel is arguing is that he
was caught on the horns of a dilemma by the discussion
of counsel outside of the presence of the jury. It was
the counsel for plaintiffs' position that if the store
manager claimed it was not practical to make an extension, then at that point he would ask that the same
had been done. It should be noted, however, that stage
of the proceeding has never reached this point because
the store manager answered it was practical to extend
the height of the railing. What counsel seems to be
arguing is that if plaintiffs' counsel had not forewarned
him of what his next question might be then perhaps
the store manager may have answered the question in
a different manner. Of course, we assume that the
store manager answered truthfully and to the best of
his ability. In this case the store manager testified
that he was present for some years prior to the accident and that it was his duty to observe danger-
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ous conditions in the store. The que.stions presented
were rroper. To argue what may have happened if the
manager would have answered differently is quite
remote. Again, it is repeated there is no place in the
record where evidence was introduced or attempted to
be introduced that showed, in fact, Penneys had extended the height of its banister.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SUSTAINING PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS
TO DEFENDANT'S PR 0 FE RR E D EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues the trial court committed prejudical error by sustaining an objection to a proposed
question. Before this ruling may be subject to review by
this Court the record must indicate the answer which
the witness would have given to the question. This rule
is set forth in 4 Am. Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec.
520, page 956, wherein it is stated:
"It appears to be the decided weight of authority that where an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained, the ruling will
not be reviewed unless the record shows what his
answer would have been, or at least what the
questioner expected or proposed to prove by the
witness, since otherwise the record does not affirmatively show that the answers would have
been competent and material or that the appellant was prejudiced by the ruling."
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In Re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731, set

forth the general rule to be as follows:

"It is argued, however, that the protestants, in
this connection, made certain offers of proof respecting the contents of the prior will, and that
it was made to appear what the changes were,
and hence the proof offered was immaterial.

". . . Nor are we inclined to depart from the
general rule that unless it appears from the offer
the evidence is material the ruling of the court
will be upheld. The reason upon which the rule
rests is that the party offering the testimony
must know what it is, and if, upon his statement,
it is not material, no error can be committed by
its exclusion . . ."
This rule is also supported by other cases. John C.
Blackard et al. v. Monarch's Manufacturers and Distributors, Inc., 169 N.E. 2d 735, 97 A.L.R. 2d 1255,

explained.

"Appellants, in urging that the trial court erred
in sustaining objections to various questions propounded by them, have failed to show how these
rulings could have prejudiced their case. Excluded testimony is not available on appeal unless the court was advised of the specific testimony sought to be elicited. In order to preserve
for review the refusal of the court to permit a
witness to answer a question on direct examination, the motion for new trial must show the
question, the objection, and the offer to prove
what evidence would have been given by the
witness in answer to the question."
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And in State of New Mexico vs. Hyman Roy, 60
P.2d 646, llO A.L.R. 1, it is stated:

"As to the sixth assignment of error, predicated
upon the refusal of the trial court to permit certain witnesses to answer questions propounded to
them in an attempt to show that the defendant
was of a peculiar nature, we are compelled to rule
against the defendant. We cannot tell from the
record whether the defendant was prejudiced.
The record is silent as to what the evidence
would have been if not excluded by the court on
objection of the prosecution. The defendant failed to make a tender of the testimony which he
expected to elicit from the witnesses.
In the case at bar the question sustained by the trial
court was as fallows:
"Q. During the time that you have worked
at the store, did work at the store, from 1961 up
until the time of this accident, to your knowledge
had there been any children or other people that
had fallen over the stairs?
MR. DIBBLEE: I object to that, your
Honor, as being immaterial.
MR. NEBEKER: I think it is material. I
think it goes to the question of notice and under
Walgreen, the case of Erickson vs. Walgreen,
we're entitled to show this is a safe area. At Walgreen's they did let them show how many people
went through the doorway without any falls or
any accidents."

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the record, in
light of the above authorities, simply does not support
the defendant's claim of error.

19

Furthermore, the reasons set forth on page 12 of
the defendant's brief do not support his claim that "defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence
of the absence of prior accidents for two critical, independent reasons". He asserts that these two reasons are
as follows:
1. "* * * such testimony would be evidence that
the banister was not a dangerous fixture in defendant's
store."
2. "* * * the testimony, if allowed, would have
shown that the defendant had no notice of the allegedly
dangerous condition."
As to his first contention, the Court in Erickson v.
JfT algreen Drug Co. 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210, held
that:
"Evidence of the absence of accidents occurring
prior to the accident complained of may not be
admissible to establish that an unsafe condition
did not exist at the time of the accident in question."
His second contention is equally as untenable. In
Owen v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., Cal. 187 P.2d 785,
the Court held:
"On examination of one of defendant's witnesses
counsel for defendant asked the witness if he had
ever heard of a similar accident. Objection to
this question was sustained. Exception is now
made to the ruling, arguing that by the admission
of such evidence it would show that defendant
had not expected any similar accident and would
20

have no reason to believe that any harm would
come from the loading of the barrels in the manner in which they were loaded, citing Hyland v.
Seaver, supra. The ruling was not error. While a
plaintiff may prove previous accidents, for certain limited purposes, a defendant may not, at
least in the first instance, prove absence of previous accidents. (Thompson v. B. F. Goodrich
Co., 48 Cal. App.2d 723, 729, 120 P.2d 693.)
See also Hawke v. Barnes, et al, 294, P.2d 1008,
which stated:
"It is next argued that the court erred in refusing to allow defendant to testify that no person
had previously fallen in this area. Plaintiff produced no evidence to the contrary. It was held
that for certain limited purposes the plaintiff
may prove previous accident.s but a defendant at
least in the first instance, may not prove absence
of previous accidents."

In the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co.,
supra, the court discussed the circumstances which
makes such evidence admissible by stating:
"But such evidence is clearly admissible to prove
that a possessor of land had no knowledge nor
could he be charged _with knowledge that an unsafe condition existed, particularly when the unsafe condition complained of is latent. In the
instant case the appellant can only be liable if
the terrazzo floor when wet subjected business
visitors to an unreasonable risk and the appellant
either knew or by the exercise of reasonable care
could have discovered that such a condition existed. Evidence that thousands of business visitors had walked through the entranceway in all
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kinds of weather and that none of them had ever
complained to the appellant of slipping on the
terrazzo slab, while not conclusive on the q11i>stion, as heretofore pointed out, does have probative value upon the question whether the appellant knew or should have known of the existence
of an unreasonable risk to customers entering and
leaving the store."
It is clear that the foregoing ruling applies to cases
where the charged unsafe condition is latent and hidden. The alleged unsafe condition in the Erickson case
was transient in nature and became unsafe by the application of some outside element, that is, rain on the terrazzo. Certainly, in this type of case, evidence of the absence of anyone slipping could have had probative
value. In the case at Bar, however, the charged unsafe
condition concerns the construction aspect of the banister and is a strictly patent and obvious condition. It
was not incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove that def endant knew small children would be in the store. Nor were
they required to prove that the banister was only 36
inches high, contained a 71;2 inch climbable mopboard
around its base, or that it had no extension to increase
its height. These facts were all known to the defendant
because it constructed and maintained in the store the
banister. These conditions, considered as a whole, were
obvious defects which rendered this banister unsafe in
an area where children were expected to frequent.

In view of the foregoing, proof of the absence of
any prior accidents is immaterial and gives the defend-
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ant no additional notice as to the condition of this banister. Thus, the allegation that "such testimony was critical to the defendant's case, and under Utah law should
clearly have been admitted" stands totally unsupported
under the circumstances.
Another factor which makes this question objectionable is that it was limited in its application. The requested information only concerned the three year period during which the witness had worked for the store.
It did not encompass the time from the original construction of the store and banister to the date of the
accident. The question was also limited to the knowledge of the witness and did not include the full and
complete records of the defendant company.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit the evidence clearly
presented an issue of fact as to the unsafe condition of
the banister which the small boy fell over. The record
shows the trial court properly instructed the jury as to
the law applicable to the facts of the case and after due
deliberation the jury found defendant failed to discharge its duty toward plaintiffs and awarded judgment
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to plaintiffs. The evidence clearly supports the finding
of the jury, and in the interest of justice, this Court
should sustain the verdict rendered by the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
ROBERT D. MOORE of
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
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